Military Science and Tactics

Military Science and Tactics

Investigating the effect of the Stringency of Military Agreements on the Expropriation of Military under different levels Instability of the Political System.

Document Type : Research/Original/Regular Article

Author
Mostafa Heidari Haratemeh
Associate Professor of the Department of Economics, Naragh Branch, Islamic Azad .University, Naragh, Iran
10.22034/qjmst.2025.2046581.2131
Abstract
Objective:The aim of investigating the interactions between the Stringency of military agreements, the instability of the political system, and the structure of military ownership.
Methodology:The current research is in the category of descriptive-correlational research from the perspective of practical purpose and from the perspective of method and nature.The data related to the military interactions of the agreements formed between the countries and defense military forces with an average of three foreign defense military activities were selected and collected and analyzed using paired logistic regression.
Findings:The instability of the political system and the strength of the military pacts in a non-interactive way did not have a significant impact on the structure of military ownership, but in the interactive mode, with the increase of the instability of the political system, the military pacts reverse the priorities of the military forces to choose the interactions of the majority instead of the minority. At higher levels of instability of the political system, the more decisive Stringency of military agreements increases the possibility of increasing the choice of military forces from the structure of military ownership.
Conclusion:The more precise the content of military treaties, the more effective they can be in preventing adverse actions andgovernment influence, as a result of political instability in a host country.While the existence of military agreements can lead to compliance by clarifying obligations, government participation, and strengthening the implementation of agreements the greater legal strengthof military agreements determines the credibility ofthe commitment to protect the property rights of military activists.
Keywords
Stringency
Military Agreements
Instability of the Political System
Expropriation of Military
Subjects
 
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Military Science and Tactics
Volume 21, Issue 73
Autumn 2025
Pages 107-131